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ABSTRACT 
Quantum Cryptography or Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that allows the secure 
distribution of a bit string, used as key in cryptographic protocols. When it was noted that quantum 
computers could break public key cryptosystems based on number theory extensive studies have been 
undertaken on QKD. Based on quantum mechanics, QKD offers unconditionally secure communication. 
Now, the progress of research in this field allows the anticipation of QKD to be available outside of 
laboratories within the next few years. Efforts are made to improve the performance and reliability of the 
implemented technologies. But several challenges remain despite this big progress. The task of how to 
test the apparatuses of QKD For example did not yet receive enough attention. These devises become 
complex and demand a big verification effort. In this paper we are interested in an approach based on the 
technique of probabilistic model checking for studying quantum information. Precisely, we use the 
PRISM tool to analyze the security of BB84 protocol and we are focused on the specific security property 
of eavesdropping detection. We show that this property is affected by the parameters of quantum channel 
and the power of eavesdropper. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The security has become a big task in wired and wireless networks. The characteristics of 
networks pose both challenges and opportunities in achieving security goals, such as 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, access control, and no repudiation. 
Cryptographic techniques are widely used for secure communications.  
Classical cryptography is composed schematically by two systems: symmetric encryption and 
asymmetric encryption. 
The cryptosystems of symmetric encryption use the same key for cipher and decipher messages. 
The key must be preserved secret by the parties of a communication. So in a network of   people 
wanting to communicate in a confidential way with a cryptosystems of symmetric encryption, it 
is necessary that the keys are distinct. Precisely, it is necessary to create and distribute 
( 1) 2n n −  keys which are distinct and secret. As we can remark, the cryptosystems of 
symmetric encryption suffer from the problem of creation and distribution the keys. This 
problem is mainly solved by the installation of the cryptosystems of asymmetric encryption [1]. 
A cryptosystem of asymmetric encryption operates by handling two keys: secret and public. 
Each participant diffuses a public key with his name. If one wishes to communicate with a 
participant, it is necessary to recover his public key and cipher with it the message, and send the 
ciphered message to this participant which is the only person who knows the secret key which 
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makes possible to decipher the received messages. The secret key is of course related to the 
public key, in practice by a mathematical relation.  
So, classical cryptography algorithms are based on mathematical functions. The robustness of a 
given cryptosystem is based essentially on the secrecy of its (private) key and the difficulty with 
which the inverse of its one-way function(s) can be calculated. Unfortunately, there is no 
mathematical proof that will establish whether it is not possible to find the inverse of a given 
one-way function. On the contrary, Quantum Cryptography (or Quantum Key Distribution 
QKD) is a method for sharing secret keys, whose security can be formally demonstrated. The 
use of Quantum Cryptography will enforce safety, dependability and security of information 
and communication technologies infrastructures and critical infrastructures. 
QKD aims at exploiting the laws of quantum physics in order to carry out a cryptographic task. 
The idea of QKD did not attract much attention at first, research efforts have increased since the 
1990s when it was proved that quantum computers could break the public-key cryptosystems 
commonly used in modern cryptography. Also a more interest has been generated after the first 
practical demonstration over 30 cm of free space employing polarisation coding [2]. Various 
theoretical and experimental studies have been undertaken, and prototype products are now 
commercially available. 
The laws of quantum physics guarantee the security of quantum cryptography protocols. The 
BB84 protocol is the first quantum cryptography protocol, which was proposed by Bennett and 
Brassard in 1984 [2]. The security proof of this protocol against arbitrary eavesdropping 
strategies was first proved by Mayers [3], and a simple proof was later shown by Shor and 
Preskill [4]. 
The mathematical proof of security of quantum cryptography protocols is not enough to assure 
that the implementation of a system related to certain quantum protocol is secure. As in 
traditional cryptography, during the progress from an ideal protocol to an implementation, 
several flaws of security can appear. Thus, even extensive research has been initiated for 
sophisticated implementation of quantum cryptography in practical communication networks, 
these systems are difficult to design; it is very important to analyze and verify such systems 
with more details related to their practical implementation. 
In our paper we present an analysis using PRISM [5]; a tool of the technique of probabilistic 
model checking. Our work is done in the same manner as [6] and [7], but our effort is 
concentrated on the property of detecting the eavesdropper. We also introduce new parameters 
of quantum channel’s efficiency and the parameter of the eavesdropper’s power. We show that 
these parameters affect the detecting of the eavesdropper. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The related works is introduced in section 
2. In Section 3 we provide a detailed description of the BB84 protocol. In Section 4 we give a 
simple presentation of the technique of model checking and we show why this technique is 
desired to analyze protocols of quantum key distribution. In section 5 we present our analysis of 
BB84’s security by introducing parameters of the channel and the eavesdropper in order to 
study the property of eavesdropping detection. Section 6 concludes our work by giving the main 
results. 
2. RELATED WORKS 
Analysis of quantum protocols is treated by certain authors. Especially the issue of analyzing 
quantum protocols by the technique of model checking is already introduced in the literature. 
More specially, using the approach of model checking for studying quantum cryptography 
protocols has been also evoked. 
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In the article [8], the authors Rajagopal Nagarajan and Simon Gay propose to analyze quantum 
protocols by the techniques of formal verification which was applied and developed in classical 
computing for the analysis of communicating concurrent systems. In such techniques, the first 
step in formal verification is to define a model of the system to be analysed, in a well-founded 
mathematical notation. Next, based on the same underlying theory, an automated analysis tool is 
used to reason about the system.  
The authors Rajagopal Nagarajan, Simon Gay and Nikolaos Papanikolaou In their article [9] 
describe fundamental and general techniques for formal verification of quantum protocols. 
Because current analyses of quantum protocols use a traditional mathematical approach and 
require considerable understanding of the underlying physics, the authors argue that automated 
verification techniques provide an elegant alternative. They show the feasibility of these 
techniques through the use of PRISM, a probabilistic model-checking tool. In their articles [10]-
[11], they establish model-checking techniques for the automated analysis of quantum 
information protocols. Precisely they have described QMC, a model-checking tool for quantum 
protocols. As opposed to simulation systems, QMC is the first dedicated verification tool for 
quantum protocols. QMC enables the modeling and verification of properties of quantum 
protocols expressible in the quantum formalism. 
Directed related to our work,  in the article [12] the authors Rajagopal Nagarajan, Nikolaos 
Papanikolaou, Garry Bowen and Simon Gay introduce the use of computer–aided verification as 
a practical means for analysing the QKD protocol BB84. based on probabilistic model–checking 
approach, they have used the PRISM model–checker to show that, the equivocation of the 
eavesdropper with respect to the channel decreases exponentially as the number of qubits 
transmitted in BB84 is increased. They have also shown that the probability of detecting the 
presence of an eavesdropper increases exponentially when the number of qubits. 
In the article [7] the authors Mohamed Elboukhari, Mostafa Azizi, and Abdelmalek Azizi 
present a methodology based on model checking for analyzing quantum information systems. 
Particularly they are interested in the QKD protocol B92.  Using the PRISM tool as a 
probabilistic model checker, they demonstrate that the protocol B92 fulfilled specific security 
properties. The authors in the article [13] use the same technique to analyze certain security’s 
properties of B92 protocol; they are interested in the specific security property of eavesdropping 
detection. They have shown that this property is affected by the power of eavesdropper and the 
parameters of quantum channel. 
Others works related to the analysis of quantum protocols can be found in [6]-[14]-[15]-[16]. 
3. BB84 PROTOCOL 
Quantum cryptography is only used to produce and distribute a key {0,1}NK = , not to transmit 
any message data. This key can then be used with any chosen encryption algorithm to encrypt 
(and decrypt) a message, which can then be transmitted over a standard communication channel 
(classical channel). 
The security of quantum cryptography relies on the foundations of quantum mechanics, in 
contrast to traditional public key cryptography which relies on the computational difficulty of 
certain mathematical functions. Also traditional public key cryptography cannot provide any 
indication of eavesdropping or guarantee of key security. Quantum key distribution has an 
important and unique properly; it is the ability of the two communicating users (traditionally 
referred to as Alice and Bob) to detect the presence of any third party (referred to as Eve) trying 
to gain knowledge of the key. A third party trying to eavesdrop on the key must in some way 
measure it, thus introducing detectable anomalies. By using quantum superpositions or quantum 
entanglement and transmitting information in quantum states over a quantum channel (such as 
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an optical fiber or free air), a communication system can be implemented which detects 
eavesdropping. 
BB84 was the first studied and practical implemented QKD physical layer protocol. It was 
elaborated by Charles Bennet and Gilles Brassard in 1984 in their article [2]. It is surely the 
most famous and most realized quantum cryptography protocol. This scheme uses the 
transmission of single polarized photons (as the quantum states). The polarizations of the 
photons are four, and are grouped together in two different non orthogonal basis. 
Generally the two non orthogonal basis are: 
-base ⊕  of the horizontal (0°) and vertical polarization (+90°), and we represent the base states 
with the intuitive notation: 0  and 1 . We have  ⊕ = { 0 , 1 } . 
-base ⊗  of the diagonal polarizations (+45°) and (+135°). The two different base states are +  
and −  with 
1 (
2
0 1 )+ = +
 and 
1 (
2
0 1 )− = − . We have  ⊗ = { , }+ − . 
In this protocol, the association between the information bit (taken from a random number 
generator) and the basis are described in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Coding scheme for the BB84 protocol. 
Bit ⊕  ⊗  
0 000 a=  10a+ =  
1 011 a=  11a− =  
 
The BB84 can be described as follows [17]: 
1) Quantum Transmissions (First Phase) 
a) Alice chooses a random string of bits nd {0,1}∈ , and a random string of bases 
nb { , }∈ ⊕ ⊗ , where n N> . 
b) Alice prepares a photon in quantum state ija  for each bit id  in d  and ib  in b  as in 
Table 1, and sends it to Bob over the quantum channel. 
c) With respect to either ⊕  or ⊗ , chosen at random, Bob measures each ija  received. Bob’s 
measurements produce a string ' n{0,1}d ∈ , while his choices of bases form ' n{0,1}b ∈ . 
2) Public Discussion (Second Phase) 
a) For each bit id  in d  
i) Alice over the classical channel sends the value of ib  to Bob. 
ii) Bob responds to Alice by stating whether he used the same basis for the 
 measurement. Both id  and 
'
id  are discarded if 
'
i ib b≠ . 
b) Alice chooses a random subset of the remaining bits in d and discloses their values to 
Bob over the classical channel (over internet for example). If the result of Bob’s 
measurements for any of these bits does not match the values disclosed, eavesdropping is 
detected and communication is aborted. 
c) the string of bits remaining in d once the bits disclosed in step 2b) are removed is the 
common secret key, {0,1}NK = . 
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To understand BB84 protocol it very important to describe how we measure a qubit in the field 
of quantum physics; if we have a qubit as qubit e c f g= +  so the measure of this state in 
the basis { , }c g  produces the state c  with the probability of 2| |e  and the state of g  with 
the probability of 2| |f  and of course 2 2| | | | 1e f+ =  ( 2| |e is the absolute square of the 
amplitude of e ). So, measuring with the incorrect basis yields a random result, as predicted by 
quantum theory. Thus, if Bob chooses the ⊗  basis to measure a photon in state 1 , the classical 
outcome will be either 0 or 1 with equal probability because 
1
1 ( )
2
= + − − ; if the ⊕  basis 
was chosen instead, the classical outcome would be 1 with certainty because 1 1 1 0 0= + . 
To detect Eve, Alice and Bob perform a test for eavesdropping in step 2b) of the protocol. The 
idea is that, wherever Alice and Bob’s bases are identical (i.e. 'i ib b= ), the corresponding bits 
should match (i.e. 'i id d= ). If not, an external disturbance is produced or there is noise in the 
quantum channel, we suppose all that is caused by Eve. In our article we are interested in 
analyzing this important property assured by quantum mechanics: the enemy’s presence is 
always made manifest to the legitimate users. 
4. WHY MODEL CHECKING FOR QUANTUM KEY 
DISTRIBUTION? 
In software and hardware design of complex systems, more time and effort are spent on 
verification than on construction. Techniques are sought to reduce and ease the verification 
efforts while increasing their coverage. In this context, formal verification is the act of proving 
or disproving the correctness of intended algorithms underlying a system with respect to a 
certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics. Model checking 
is an approach of formal verification. Model checking is a verification technique that explores 
all possible system states in a brute-force manner. In the field of logic in computer science, 
model checking refers to the following problem: Given a model of a system, test automatically 
whether this model meets a given specification. Using a specialized software tool (called a 
model–checker), a system implementor can mechanically prove that the system satisfies a 
certain set of requirements. 
In the literature there are several Proofs of unconditional security of the BB84 protocol [3]-[4], 
but as Gottesman and Lo [18] point out that “the proof of security of QKD is a fine theoretical 
result, but it does not mean that a real QKD system would be secure”. Thus more flexible 
approach to analyzing the security of quantum cryptographic protocols is clearly desirable. A 
real component of a system may be quantum, but others could still be classical. So, 
manufacturers of commercial quantum cryptographic systems [19], for instance, require 
efficient and rigorous methods for design and testing.  
In our article we propose to analyze the security of BB84 protocol by model checking. 
Generally to realize this, we build an abstract model, noted M and we express it in a description 
language. Also, we describe the desired behavior of the system in a set of temporal 
formulae ip . The model and the formulae are the input of the model–checker.  
For systems which have a probabilistic behavior, a variation of this technique is used; a 
probabilistic model–checker, such as PRISM [20]. System properties for PRISM models are 
written in Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL). PRISM models are represented by 
probabilistic transition systems. 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Volume 2, Number 2, April 2010 
 
 
92 
 
In PRISM we verify if the model M satisfy the property defined by ip  (i.e. whether  for each 
ipM ‘ property ip ), and with PRISM we compute the probability: 
 r iP {M p }‘  (1) 
Also, we can parameterize the model M  by writing 1 2 3( , , , , )nM M x x x x= …  and the 
probability (1) can be calculated for different value of ix , this enables us to have a meaningful 
plot of the variation of (1). 
A model in PRISM is formed by components called modules. Each module has a sequence of 
actions to be achieved and its own local variables. The actions take the following form: 
 [ ] ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2: var : var : (var )n n naction a value a value a value→ = + = + …… + =   (2) 
In this equation, the variable vari  is assigned by ivalue  with probability ia  (
1
1
i n
i
i
a
=
=
=∑ ). In case 
where 1n =  we have the notation: ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1: var vara value value= = =  with 1 1a = . The model 
checker PRISM permits us to specify arbitrarily probabilities for actions, for example in case 
2n =  we can model a tendency in BB84 protocol of Alice in the choice of the quantum states 
by a module containing the action: 
 [ ] 00.8 : ( | 1 ) 0.2 : ( );EtatOfAlice true EtatAlice EtatAlice→ = 〉 + =  (3) 
Here, Alice is biased towards choosing the state 1  to encode the data 1 as in Table 1. 
5. ANALYSIS OF BB84 PROTOCOL USING THE MODEL CHECKER PRISM 
5.1 Description of the Model BB84 in PRISM Tool 
PRISM is a probabilistic model checking tool being developed at the University of 
Birmingham. Conventional model checkers input a description of a model, represented as a state 
transition system, and a specification, typically a formula in some temporal logic, and return 
“yes” or “no”, indicating whether or not the model satisfies the specification. In the case of 
probabilistic model checking, the models are probabilistic, in the sense that they encode the 
probability of making a transition between states instead of simply the existence of such a 
transition, and analysis normally entails calculation of the actual likelihoods through appropriate 
numerical or analytical methods. 
We have elaborated a model of BB84 in PRISM noted 84BBM . It is done within a file 
containing modules that represent the components of the system. In our model of BB84, there is 
a module corresponding to each party involved in the protocol (Alice, Bob and Eve), plus a 
module representing the quantum channel. 
As mentioned before, we are interested to studying by PRISM the specific security property that 
BB84 protocol must offer: an enemy who tries to eavesdrop must be detected. So, as mentioned 
in [2], if Alice and Bob know that Eve is trying to eavesdrop, they can be in agreement to use 
the technique of purification and/or temporarily to stop the key establishment process. 
By using our model of BB84, we can calculate the probability: 
 r 84 detP { p }BBM ‘  (4) 
Where detp  represents a formula PCTL, its Boolean value is TRUE  if the enemy is detected. 
We can vary n , the number of photons transmitted involved in the communication between 
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Alice and Bob, and so in our PRISM model this probability is a function of n . Let us write the 
probability of detecting the enemy like:  
 r 84det detP (n) P { p }BBM= ‘  (5) 
PRISM calculates exactly the probability of detecting an enemy, Eve. But we must give the 
definition of detp . For that we must state the random event ω  occurs when an enemy is 
detected, this will enable us to write detP (n)  like a classical probability ( )rP ω . 
5.2. The Expression of detp  
In our model 84BBM , Eve performs the attack “main in the middle”; Eve receives each photon 
on the quantum channel, measures it with her basis denoted ''ib , obtaining a bit value 
''
id , and 
then transmits to Bob a new photon, representing ''id  in the 
''
ib  basis. Eve has to make a random 
choice of basis, denoted ''ib , which may or may not match Alice’s original choice, ib . In the 
case  
''
i ib b= , Eve is sure that she measured the  i-th photon correctly; otherwise, quantum 
theory predicts that her measurement result will be correct with the probability of 1 2 . 
For the detection of Eve, Bob must choose the correct basis (as Alice) for his measurement. If 
Bob obtains an incorrect bit value despite having used the correct basis, this is because an 
enemy has caused a disturbance. Here we assume that the quantum channel is noisy and for the 
need of security we suppose all noise is due to Eve. So, Eve is detected as soon as the following 
event has occurs: 
 ( ) ( )' '   i i i ib b d d for some i nω = = ∧ ≠ ≤  (6) 
Therefore, we can give the expression of  detP (n)  as a classical probability: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }' 'det rP n P   i i i ib b d d for some i n= = ∧ ≠ ≤  (7) 
The PCTL formula detp  corresponding is: 
 ( ) ( )' 'detp { }i i i iTRUE b b d d= = ∧ ≠∪  (8) 
5.3. Influence of Quantum Channel’s Efficiency on the Eve’s Detection 
The quantum channel in our model BB84 is written in a module called Quantum Channel which 
can be in reality optical fiber or free air. We propose to simulate the influence of the channel’s 
efficiency on the detection of Eve. For that we have elaborated three curves; curve where the 
channel is perfect and where it produces some noise and a lot of noise.  We expect that where 
the channel becomes noisy, the probability of detecting Eve increases. 
In the perfect quantum channel, there is no noise, we model this in the module Quanum 
Channel by the line: 
 [ ]( _ 0) ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' _ );aliceput ch state ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit= → = = =  (9) 
We use _ch state , _ch bas , _ch bit , _al bas , _al bit  for respectively state, base and bit of the 
channel and base and bit of Alice. This line shows that the information sent by Alice (base and 
bit) remain unchanged before it received by Eve. 
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For 1 50n≤ ≤ , PRISM calculates det (n)P , this produces the curve of detP  (noted ( 0 )detchP ) as in 
Fig. 1.  
To elaborate a curve of detP  (noted (1)detchP ) where there is a bit noise in the channel; we change 
the line (9) by this: 
[ ]( _ 0) 0.7 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' _ )aliceput ch state ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit= → = = =
 0.1 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' 1 _ ) & ( _ ' _ )ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = − =
 0.1 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' 1 _ )ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = = −
 0.1 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' 1 _ ) & ( _ ' 1 _ );ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = − = −  (10)  
As we remark, the information of Alice has been changed in a little way. If we modify the line 
(9) by the following: 
[ ]( _ 0) 0.4 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' _ )aliceput ch state ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit= → = = =
 0.2 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' 1 _ ) & ( _ ' _ )ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = − =
 0.2 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' 1 _ )ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = = −
 
0.2 : ( _ ' 1) & ( _ ' 1 _ ) & ( _ ' 1 _ );ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = − = −
 (11) 
We simulate a channel very noisy. This enables us to perform a curve of detP  (noted ( 2 )detchP ). The 
curves 
(1)
det
chP
 and ( 2 )det
chP
 are shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1.  The probabilities ( )ch idet{P (n), i 0,1, 2}=  to detect Eve where the number of photons 
transmitted by Alice is between 5 and 50. 
From the curves, we note that if we increase the number of photons emitted by Alice, the 
probability of detection of Eve increases and tends towards 1 and we have ( )detlim 1
ch i
n
P
→∞
=  
for 0 2i≤ ≤ . So, the property of detecting Eve in the BB84 protocol is clearly checked. Also, as 
the channel becomes noisy the probability of Eve’s detection becomes higher as expected and 
we have the following inequality for 5 50n≤ ≤ : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2
det det det( ) ( ) ( )ch ch chP n P n P n≤ ≤  (12) 
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5.4.  Influence of Eve’s Power of on its Detection 
As in paragraph 5.3) we want to simulate the power of Eve and we expect that if the power is 
lower, the detection of Eve is lower too. In this paragraph, we suppose the quantum channel is 
perfect. 
Firstly, the curve detP  (noted also ( )Eve 2detP ) represents the function det ( )n P n→  where Eve is 
powerful; Eve performs the attack “man in the middle” for all photons emitted by Alice to Bob. 
This appears in the module Quantum Channel as: 
 [ ]( _ 3) ( _ ' 4) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' _ );eveput ch state ch state ch bas eve bas ch bit eve bit= → = = =  (13) 
Here, _eve bas and _eve bit refer to base and bit of Eve. If we write instead the line: 
[ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' '_ 3 0.2 : _ 4 & _ _ & _ _eveput ch state ch state ch bas eve bas ch bit eve bit= → = = =
 0.8 : ( _ ' 4) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' _ );ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = =  (14) 
We model a weak attack of Eve because for several photons Eve doesn’t intercept them. By 
varying n  in the interval [5, 70] we realize the curve of detP ; we note it by ( 0 )detEveP . 
When Eve intercepts a lot of photons, we simulate a medium attack of Eve; this is done by 
changing the line (13) by the following: 
[ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' '_ 3 0.5 : _ 4 & _ _ & _ _eveput ch state ch state ch bas eve bas ch bit eve bit= → = = =
 0.5 : ( _ ' 4) & ( _ ' _ ) & ( _ ' _ );ch state ch bas al bas ch bit al bit+ = = =   (15) 
In this situation PRISM provides a curve of detP  noted 
(1)
det
EveP . The curves ( )det
Eve iP , for 0,1, 2i =  
are illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2.  The probabilities ( )Eve idet{P (n), i 0,1, 2}=  to detect Eve where the number of photons 
transmitted by Alice is between 5 and 70. 
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In this figure we remark also that if we increase n , the number of photons transmitted by Alice, 
the probability of detection increase too and we have ( )detlim ( ) 1
Eve i
n
P n
→+∞
= , 0,1, 2i = and thus the 
property of detection in BB84 protocol is verified. 
More interesting, if the power of Eve become lower the probability of her detection becomes 
smaller, this clearly showed by the inequality for 5 70n≤ ≤ : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2
det det det( ) ( ) ( )Eve o Eve EveP n P n P n≤ ≤  (16) 
6. CONCLUSION 
Conventional cryptography such as symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, often involve the 
use of cryptographic keys. But all cryptographic techniques will be ineffective if the key 
distribution mechanism is weak. The security of these mechanisms of key distribution 
mechanism is based on computational complexity and the extraordinary time needed to break 
the code. QKD is attracting much attention as a solution of the problem of key distribution; 
QKD offers unconditionally secure communication based on quantum mechanics. And QKD 
could well be the first application of quantum mechanics at the single quanta level.  Actually, 
many experiments have demonstrated that keys can be exchanged over distances of a few tens 
of kilometers at rates at least of the order of a thousand bits per second and there is no doubt 
that the technology can be mastered and will find commercial applications. 
So, the QKD cryptosystems are very promising and the technology is improving more and more 
to fulfill requirements. Now, there is a big need of testing and analysis of such systems due to 
their complexity. 
In this context, we have adopted the technique of model checking to analyze the security of the 
BB84 protocol. We have focused on studying the property of detecting the eavesdropper. By 
using the model checker PRISM we have the following results: 
- To increase the probability of the detection of eavesdropper, it is necessary to increase the 
number of photons transmitted, 
- If the quantum channel is noisy than the probability of detecting the eavesdropper increases 
too, 
- If the power of Eve becomes stronger, the probability of her detection is higher. 
So, the automatic model checker PRISM enables us to analyze BB84 protocol and this approach 
is adaptable to other protocol of quantum cryptography. Also it can be used to analyze 
heterogonous cryptographic systems containing classical and quantum components. 
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